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INTRODUCTION 
u.s.  trade law Section 301  enables the United States to extract unilateral concessions 
from its trading partners by threatening trade retaliation if the targeted countries fail to open 
their markets to American exports.  Use of managed trade practices such as Section 301 is not 
likely to subside in the near future, especially if the United States trade deficit continues to rise 
and the Uruguay round agreement does not lead to significant foreign market opening for the 
United States.  The new trade strategy of the United States is focusing  on a  -results-oriented-
approach where progress in trade can be -numerically quantified-.  Recent negotiations related 
to the Japanese automobile industry are a striking example of this trend. 
Although Section  301  of the  1974  Trade Act  gave the  President power to  combat 
foreign trade practices, retaliatory measures were rarely ever taken.  The growing U.S. trade 
deficit, especially with Japan, prompted Congress to work on a new trade bill to respond more 
aggressively  to discriminatory policies toward  the United  States,  and  to  leave the executive 
branch with less flexibility in conducting foreign trade policy.  The most recent amendments 
to  the  301  legislation  are  now  part  of Sections  301  to  310  in  the  Omnibus  Trade  and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, and include the Super 301 and Special 301 provisions.1  The 1988 
amendments were the result of Congress'  rising frustration  with  the administration's passive 
stand  against  unfair  trading  practices  and  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade's 
(GATT's) limited effectiveness in quickly resolving  trade dispute matters  (Milner,  Maskus, 
Destler). The most aggressive piece of the legislation is Super 301.  Super 301 requires that the 
U.S.  Trade Representative  (USTR)  regularly provide a list of offending countries and  their 
1 Unless otherwise noted, Section 301 in aeneral refers to the entire leaislation, inc1udina its new amendments 
and provisions. unreasonable  trade practices.  The USTR has  to set deadlines  for  the elimination of these 
practices and a prescription for retaliatory measures if the countries fail to comply.  The Special 
301 provision, on the other hand, targets those countries that fail to provide adequate protection 
of intellectual property rights for American goods. 
This resurgence of managed trade practices is worrisome because it may increase trade 
frictions, especially if other nations follow the U.S. example and enact similar legislation.  A 
famous example involves the threat of trade war between the United States and the European 
Union  (EU)  because of France's resistance to  lower oilseed  subsidies,  as demanded by the 
USTR.  The USTR negotiated with the EU under the GAIT following an industry complaint 
under Section  301  in  1987.  The dispute stalled  the Uruguay round for almost a  year and 
involved U.S. punitive threats of 200% import tariffs on EU food products. Finally in 1992, 
agreement was reached -mainly because of  France's inability to veto the EU's decision to accept 
a 21 % reduction in the volume of subsidized grains.  Another danger with unilateralism such 
as Section 301 is that it is an alternative way to resolve trade disputes to the dispute settlement 
mechanism provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO). If  effective, unilateralism could 
be perceived as a shortcut and substitute for -global- institutions such as the WTO, and it could 
undermine them and their free trade mandate (Staiger). 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of  countries' concessionary 
or tough attitudes and the likelihood of trade war under Section 301.  It  attempts to quantify and 
clarify  some  of the  debate  regarding  U.S.  trade  management  practices  and  their  potential 
effectiveness  (or lack of).  The empirical  analysis  uses  Crawford's disagreement theory  to 
classify  Section  301  outcomes  into  four  categories  that  distinguish  between  trade  war, 
2 compromise, compliance by the foreign country, and backing down from the United States.  A 
system of two probit equations is estimated using  historical data on Section 301  cases.  The 
estimation provides estimates of  the likelihood of each country standing firm and the subsequent 
probability of trade war.  In the United States, policymakers are more likely to stand frrm for 
cases initiated by Democratic administrations (the President or the USTR) and when the U.S. 
share in the world market is declining and less dependent on the targeted country's market. 
Foreign policymakers are more likely to stand frrm in election years, and when the negotiations 
relate to highly protected and unionized industries.  All these factors increase the likelihood of 
trade war. It  also appears that Section 301 increases the likelihood of trade war for cases where 
trade liberalization may yield large welfare gains (highly protected and well organized foreign 
industries)  and  hence,  this  trade  management  practice  contradicts  the  intent  of the  policy 
objective. 
Several papers have addressed the implications of Section 301 (e.g., Bhagwati 1990a, b; 
Bayard and Elliott).  The investigation by Bayard and Elliott is the most relevant to our study. 
They provide a single-equation prediction of the likelihood of a successful foreign market based 
on U.S.  economic  variables.  While informative,  the  latter  study  lumps  radically  different 
strategic  choices  (standing  firm  or  backing  down)  into  the  same  outcome  category 
(successful/unsuccessful  opening),  which,  in  turn,  does  not  explain  how  trade  wars  arise. 
Further, treating the probability of successfully opening foreign markets as being independent 
of the environment in the foreign country may lead to a biased response of the success rate of 
Section 301.  The contribution and distinctive feature of our study is to look at both the foreign 
country's and the U.S. political arid  market conditions to determine the countries' bargaining 
3 decisions leading to four possible outcomes, one of which is trade war. 
A fmal insight: the empirical game-theoretic literature on trade negotiations is scarce and 
focuses on quantifying successful negotiations with axiomatic approaches assuming efficiency 
and  complete infoni1ation  (Chan,  Baldwin and Clarke).  This literature is mute on the more 
intriguing question of inefficient outcomes which our paper addresses extensively. 
MODELLING THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER SECTION 301 
The legislative procedure of Section 301  starts when a specific U.S. industry, firm or 
association  files  a  petition  with  the  USTR  alleging  that  a  foreign  industry  or country  is 
discriminating against U.S. exports.  The USTR then initiates an investigation and holds public 
hearings.  Recently,  however,  the USTR has been self-initiating investigations regarding the 
practices of foreign industries or countries that restrict U.S. exports.  If  the investigations lead 
the USTR to  believe that  the foreign  country's practices impose an undue burden on U.S. 
commerce, then bilateral or GAIT negotiations are held with the targeted foreign industry or 
country.  If negotiations succeed, an agreement or compromise is reached, ending the petition. 
If negotiations fail, the USTR has the authority (since 1988), "subject to the specific direction, 
if any,  of the  President",  to retaliate  against  the offending  country by raising  U.S.  tariffs 
(Bhagwati 1990b, Office of the USTR). 
Trade negotiations under Section 301 can be stylized into a two-step game a  la Crawford. 
In Crawford,  the bargaining problem is  an  attempt by each player to commit himself to a 
favorable bargaining position.  Committing to a specific demand is advantageous in the sense 
that a player who attempts commitment signals to increase the credibility of  his demand and may 
induce his opponent to give in.  Th~  benefit of this action is traded off by a positive probability 
4 of disagreement.  With uncertain but sometimes irreversible commitment, when players do not 
know if they will back down later in the game depending on the actual cost of backing down, 
committing to an incompatible demand and thereby risking a break-down in negotiations is a 
rational strategy (Crawford). 
We assume  that under Section 301  bargaining  occurs in  two  stages and  the players' 
moves  are  simultaneous.  In the  first  stage,  the  United  States  attempts  a  commitment  by 
demanding trade concessions from  the targeted  foreign  country.  Simultaneously, the foreign 
trade negotiators attempt commitment by demanding a minimum level of trade barriers on U.S. 
imports.  Once these demands are made, it is assumed to be politically costly to back down from 
these demands because of loss of domestic political support and of reputation as a tough trade 
partner.  In the second stage,  the United States learns its own costs of backing down and the 
demands of the foreign country, and then decides whether to stick to its demand or back down 
from it.  The foreign country proceeds similarly.  The important assumption here is that neither 
player knows his opponent's costs of backing down.  This asymmetric assumption rests on the 
belief that each country has more information on its own political costs of backing down than 
on its opponent's compliance costs (McMillan). 
The perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution to the game implies that empty threats 
are ruled out and expected payoffs are computed using Bayesian probabilities.  The probability 
of impasse is therefore determined endogenously and depends on the parameters of the model. 
The Bayesian equilibrium solution always involves both players attempting commitment to some 
position, a dominant strategy.  The positions taken,  however, can be either compatible or not 
and depending on the parameters of the model, the equilibrium solutions can either result in a 
5 compromise agreement or no agreement at all, an inefficient outcome.  If  both the United States 
and  its  trade  partner  commit to  incompatible  demands  and  do  not  back down  from  their 
positions, then the outcome is one of  disagreement. If  the commitment demands are compatible, 
then they reach a compromise solution where each player receives at least what he demanded. 
If  only one country has achieved a successful commitment, the efficient outcome is one in which 
it receives  its  demand,  while if both  countries  back down  from  their  demands,  then  the 
compromise outcome is reached that is assumed to be on the payoff frontier. 
Define the disagreement's welfare outcomes by Wi and vr, where 1 stands for the United 
States  and  2  represents  the  foreign  country.  Figure  1  shows  the  different  welfare  level 
possibilities for both countries in utility space.  The highest feasible welfare levels are denoted 
by  Wi  and w 2.  The  contract  zone  includes  the  pairs  (Wi, vl)  such  that  ~I  S Wi S Wi  and 
~sw2sW2  with the ~'s  denoting the conflict payoffs. It is assumed that the boundary of the 
contract zone is strictly downward sloping and differentiable so that vr=4>(wl) and wl=v(w) 
and v =4>-1.  If both bargainers back down and reach a compromise the outcome is (Wl,~) such 
that ~  S VI <w  for both 1 and 2.  If  bargainers achieve commitment to compatible positions 
(Wl,~), the outcome (wl,w) is such that WI~WI and  w~~. Finally, if the United States 
alone stands fmn to its position Wi,  then the outcome is (Wi ,4>(wl». Appendix figure 1 shows 
the game in the extensive form. 
Under Section 301, both players presumably have attempted commitment to incompatible 
positions in the fust stage (Wi, w2), otherwise the procedure would not be invoked.  In the second 
stage, the decision then is whether to stand firm to their demands or back down.  This choice 
will depend mainly on the costs of backing down.  The optimal rule is such that if the costs of 
6 backing down are below a certain cut-off level di, then player i will back down.  If  the costs of 
backing down r! ~  di,  then player i  will stand firm.  In stage 1,  each policymaker assigns a 
continuous probability distribution to the potential costs of backing down in the second stage. 
The distribution function is denoted by F(r!), which is equal to  P(c~r!).  Therefore F(di)  = 
P(ciSdi) is the probability of backing down, while (l-Fi(di» is the probability of standing firm 
to one's position, which is assumed independent of the bargainers' position.  When demands are 
incompatible and retaliatory threats are invoked, the first policymaker's expected payoff is: 
d'  (1) 
[l_Fl(d1 )][F2(d2 )Wl +(l_F2(d2»~- J  c'f'(c1)dc1, 
o 
where f1  is the density function associated with Fl.  The foreign policymaker's expected payoffs 
are derived in a similar fashion.  Each term on the right-hand side of (1) represents one of the 
four payoffs  that country  1 can  receive  multiplied  by the probability of occurrence of that 
outcome.  These four outcomes are the four combinations resulting from each country backing 
down or standing firm and facing the opposing country's similar choices.  The last term on the 
right-hand side represents the expected costs of backing down. 
In stage 2,  the policy  makers choose the cut-off level of costs di that maximizes their 
expected welfare.  The fust order condition to maximize EW1(d1,d2)  with respect to d1 yields: 
which holds for f1(d1 ) >0 and d1 E  [O,Wl_~l] and where subscripts indicate derivatives.  The 
second order condition EWIU(d1,d2)  - - fl(d1 ) <0 implies that EW1  is strictly quasi-concave, 
which insures the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the second stage. 
7 When conducting foreign trade policy, negotiators are influenced by domestic political 
pressure groups that lobby for a specific trade regulation (Grossman and Helpman, Feenstra and 
Lewis).  Policymakers  maximize  a  political preference function  that  weighs  the  welfare of 
various interest groups according to their relative bargaining strengths (Becker, Zusman).  The 
payoffs, wi, represent the countries' political preference functions, which include the welfare of 
consumers,  producers  and  the  government's  objective  function  (Rausser  and  Freebairn). 
Therefore we express w1 and w2 as: 
1  _  1(  1  1  1)  and  2  _  2(  2  2  2)  W  - W  Uc,Up,U,  W  - W  Uc,Up,U,  • 
In the United States and  the foreign  country,  uc
i  could be measured by the equivalent or the 
compensating  variation  obtained  from  consuming  foreign  imported  goods.  u,i  could  be 
represented  by  the profit functions  of three  types  of domestic  producers,  which  may  have 
competing interests.  The three types of producers are a) producers exporting products to the 
foreign country, b)  producers competing with the foreign country's imports, and c)  producers 
importing inputs from the foreign country.  The government's welfare function U,i is set equal 
to the tariff revenues generated from imports minus the political costs of  backing down.  Similar 
reasoning applies to EW'- for the foreign country. 
The welfare levels for the three other outcomes also depend on the associated tariff levels 
in each case: 
where the  ~'s are the Nash non-cooperative outcomes;  the w's are the compromise solution 
8 payoffs,  and  the \\t's are the payoffs when  one country obtains its demand  while the  other 
country gives in to get tJ>(wl) or if(~. 
To relate  the probability of both policy  makers  standing  firm,  (l-pl)(l-p2),  with  the 
parameters  of the  model,  four  sets  of shifters  are  considered:  shifts  in  the  probability 
distributions denoted by ai, changes in the conflict payoffs yJ,  changes in trade barriers s and 
t, and changes in the transformation frontier  (tJ>  or if) denoted by B.  Defming al and a! as 
positive shifts in the probability of a successful commitment, (I_pi) and (1-p2) respectively, we 
can rewrite (l-Pl)(l-P~ as (1_pl(d1 ,al»(1_p2(d2  ,a~).  Comparative statics can be derived from 
the model by differentiating each expected welfare function EWi(dl,d2) with respect to die  The 
two resulting fIrst order conditions are then each differentiated with respect to dl, d2, ai, a2,  the 
whs and v's  and their associated tariff levels s and t, and shifts in the frontier, B.  Combining 
the two differentiated equations, we obtain the total effects of the a's, the w's, sand t, and B 
on d1 and d2.  Prom these equations, we can fmally derive the total impact of each parameter 
on the probability of a break-down in negotiations (1-pl)(l_p2): 
with}(i=  Wi, B, s, or t, and  (3) 
We would like to use system (3) to explain how the probability of  a break-down in negotiations, 
(l-pl)(l-p2),  changes  with  changes  in  fundamental  parameters  and  exogenous  variables  }(i. 
9 Signing  the direction of these changes,  however,  requires  much  restrictive and  simplifying 
structure (Crawford; Kherallah).  The only terms that can be reasonably signed are the ·own-
shifters· effects (e.g., ddVdai), which are negative, and the strategic interaction effects (d<P/da
i
), 
which are positive.  However, the total effect on the probability of  impasse remains ambiguous. 
Next,  we map  the parameters of the model with the relevant political and  economic 
variables.  The costs of backing down to the opponent's demand involve mainly the loss of 
domestic political support.  These political costs should rise the closer a country is to an election 
year, the greater the extent of domestic lobbying from exporting industries, and the deeper the 
anti-U.S. sentiment in the targeted country.  Bayard and Elliott have suggested that making the 
threat more public and explicit, such as when the USTR self-initiated Section 301  cases after 
1984, increases the U.S. costs of backing down.  These political factors create a positive shift 
in the probability of successful commitment (I-pi) and therefore are represented by ai.  As these 
political costs increase, the probability of standing fmn also increases, but since the total effect 
of a i on the likelihood of disagreement is ambiguous, it must be empirically determined. 
On the other hand, the larger the disagreement position,  ~i, of  a country, the more likely 
it will stand fmn to its demand, since a larger fallback payoff increases its bargaining power. 
The disagreement outcome normally is largely dependent on the trade relation  between  the 
tar&eted country and the United States.  For example, we would expect a country that is heavily 
dependent on its export sales to the United States to have an incentive to comply with U.S. 
demands because its fallback utility will decline significantly if  no agreement is reached and the 
United States imposes punitive tariffs.  This factor can be measured empirically by the ratio of 
a  country's exports  to  the United States  to  its  total  exports.  The ratio  is  expected  to be 
10 negatively correlated with YI,  but its effect on the probability of impasse is ambiguous.  The 
same effect also  applies for the United States.  If  a large share of U.S. exports goes to the 
targeted country, then the U.S. fallback position if no agreement is reached will also decline, 
significantly decreasing its probability of standing fmn. 
The trade barriers, s and t, are expressed in tariff equivalence.  The shifts in the frontier 
if  reflect changes in aggregate payoff  possibilities due to exogenous shocks that shrink or expand 
the ·world pie·.  The exogenous shocks include such things as ongoing GATT negotiations, 
world recession or market conditions, and the declining U.S. share of world markets. 
It is also possible to estimate the effects of the bargaining strength of political pressure 
groups on the probability of impasse.  Industries with more political clout are more likely to 
obtain trade outcomes in their favor because of their abilities to affect negotiators' decisions. 
This power is usually positively associated with the concentration level in the industry (Olson), 
the loss of competitive advantage, and the type of industry.  The type of political regime or 
political rights in each country are also important institutional settings that determine the ability 
of pressure groups to influence policy decisions. 
The choice of industry to target in the foreign country may not be random.  In other 
words, there may be a bias in the specific industry selected for a Section 301  case creating a 
selection  bias problem.  However,  given that information  is  not readily  available on those 
industries and countries that are not targeted by the United States, we have to qualify the issue 
of this study which is: Given that a specific foreign industry has been targeted for Section 301, 
what is the likelihood that a trade war will break-out? 
11 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
The tough or concessionary attitudes of  the United States and the targeted foreign country 
lead to four possible outcomes: both countries back down; the United States stands fmn and the 
foreign country backs down; the United States backs down and the foreign country stands firm; 
both countries stand fmn. The associated probabilities are plp2; (l_pl)p2; Pl(I_P~; and (l-pl)(I-
p2).  To estimate the probabilities of these four  outcomes and  determine the impact of the 
various exogenous variables on these probabilities, we follow the probit approach.  The choice 
of backing down or standing fmn is determined by whether the costs of backing down, rf, are 
smaller or larger than  the cut-off levels  of costs  di;  i.e., P(rf>di)=(I-pi).  The difference 
between ci and di is a latent variable that depends on the various political and economic factors 
discussed above.  Define ci - di =  yt= (:Ji'Xj+Eh  where Ej is the error term, Xj is the matrix of 
exogenous variables, and Pj'Xj is the index function.  Actual data indicate whether the country 
backs down or stands firm.  Therefore, we assign a binary variable Yi  for the two outcomes: Yj 
=  1 if  Yj·  > 0, and Yj  =- 0 if yt :s  O.  Variable Yj is observable and is equal to 1 when country 
i stands fmn and 0 otherwise.  The probability of occurrence of  Yj = 1 is equal to (I-F) and can 
now be estimated using the probit approach by assuming that the error terms Ej have a standard 
normal distribution.  In summary, we have two probit models --one for the United States and 
one for the targeted countries- of the form (l-F')= Prob(y,=I) =  ~(f3'xJ, for i-I, 2. 
Based  on the political and  the economic variables  discussed in previous Section,  we 
consider the following specifications: 
I-P=if>(ELECI1,DPIUS,SElF,EXPSU,S,T,OECDGDP,COMPl,USHRl,GA1T,CONCl,7YPEJ'S), 
~  00 
l-]i'J=if>(ELECI2,DPIF,ANI1US,EXPSF,S,T.OECDGDP,COMP2,GA1T,CONCl,7YPE,PR); 
12 where (1-Fi)  is the probability of standing firm that ranges from  0  to  1 (i=1 for the United 
States and i=2 for the foreign country).  For the United States,  the dummy representing an 
election year (ELECTl) is equal to 1 if  within that year a presidential election is held.  The 
election year in the foreign country (ELECT2) is equal to 1 if there is any type of election held 
within  that  year,  including  parliamentary  or presidential  elections.  The domestic  political 
influence in the United States, DPIUS, is measured using two types of proxies: the amount of 
PAC expenditures from each frrm,  or organization directly affected by the Section 301  case 
(pACEXP), and the employment size of each industry involved as a share of total employment 
(EMPUS).  The extent of  political influence by domestic industries in the foreign country (DPIF) 
is also approximated by the relative employment size of that industry in the country, EMPFC. 
The predicted sign of this variable is ambiguous because we expect industries with small labor 
forces to be more efficient in influencing politicians because of lower costs of organization.  On 
the other hand,  larger industries may  have more at stake and broader support and therefore 
policymakers may be more responsive to their plights. 
A dummy variable, SELF, differentiates those cases that are self-initiated by the USTR 
or the President from those initiated by industries.  To proxy the degree of anti-U.S. feeling in 
the foreign country (ANTIUS), we use the size of the socialist/communist party relative to the 
total population in the foreign country (COMMIES), and the percentage of votes won by leftist 
parties at the last election,  (VOTELEFr). The export share of the United States towards the 
foreign country (EXPSU) is defined as the ratio of  the total value of U.S. exports to the foreign 
country over the total value of U.S. exports to the Rest of the World.  Similarly, the export 
share of the foreign country towards the United States (EXPSF) is equal to that country's total 
13 value of exports to the United States over its value of total exports to the Rest of the World. 
For trade barriers, S and T, it is difficult to fmd adequate tariff-equivalent measures, 
since many cases involve nontariff barriers such as custom regulations, import licenses, health 
and  technical  regulations  and  intellectual property right infringements.  To circumvent this 
problem, we classify the magnitude of the U.S. and foreign country's tariff-equivalent rates of 
non-tariff barriers into low, medium or high levels (USSL, USSM, and USSH for the United 
States, and FCfL, FcrM, and FCTH  for the foreign country).  The classification is based on 
various sources of information regarding the trade protection measures of several countries and 
their products.2 In addition to qualitative measures on the levels of trade restrictions resulting 
from Section 301, binary variables are also used to estimate the impact of different types of 
barriers on the likelihood of backing down or standing firm.  These binary variables distinguish 
between price control measures (pCONT), quotas and quantitative restrictions (QUOTA), and 
administrative or legal barriers (ADMIN). 
The annual average GDP growth rate of all OECD countries (OECDGDP) is used to 
capture the world recession.  To measure the relative product competitiveness of a country in 
the world, we compute revealed comparative advantage indices (COMPI and COMP2, for the 
United States and the foreign country,  respectively).  The higher the value of the index, the 
more trade- competitive is that country relative to other foreign countries for that commodity. 
The U.S. share in world markets (USHRl) is calculated as the ratio of  total U.S. exports 
of the specific Section 301 targeted product over total world exports of the same product.  The 
2. Amoua tbeso ate tho NDlional Trotk EstJmau RepoI1 on Foreign Trade Barriers from tho UTSR'. offico, which 
publishes an annual list of all the trade bamera erected by foreign countries on U.S. exports.  The USTR'. office 
also admits that in several of these cases, only a qualitative judgement can be given as to the extent of restriction 
imposed by several  trade protection measures. 
14 GAIT dummy is set to 1 when a case is negotiated under the GAIT.  The concentration ratios 
in the United States (CR4) are the four-firm industry concentration ratios. 
In addition  to  the  four-firm  concentration  ratios,  the intensity of union  membership 
measures the relative degree of  that industry's power in influencing trade policy.  For the United 
States,  the percentage of union membership is at the detailed industry level (USUNS).  For 
foreign  countries,  the total percentage of organized labor (PCORG)  is  used  as a  proxy for 
overall industry strength because of lack of data, especially for developing economies.  The 
types of  industries involved in each 301 case (TYPE) are distinguished by two dummy variables, 
one for agriculture (AGIND) and one for manufacturing (MANIND). The intercept includes all 
other industry cases (services, transport, intellectual property rights). 
The political  rights  variable  (PR)  in  the  foreign  country  is  measured  by  an  index 
developed by Freedom House to proxy the degree of political freedom to organize, vote, and 
elect  representatives.  The  index  is  an  ordinal  measure  that  ranges  from  1  to  7  with  1 
representing a fully competitive electoral process and 7 representing political despotism.  Finally, 
the PS dummy is assigned a value of one if the U.S. President is a Republican and zero if he 
is a Democrat.  The defInitions, proxies and sources for the exogenous variables listed in system 
(4)  are summarized in Appendix Table 1.  Once the two probit models described above are 
estimated,  the impact of the  selected  continuous  explanatory variables on the likelihood of 
disagreement (l-Fl)(1-Fl) can be derived with standard procedures (see Kherallah for details). 
RESULTS 
The data used  for this  empirical analysis include all Section 301  cases  flled  with the 
USTR from  1975 to 1992.  The cases are tabulated by the office of the USTR. Each case is 
15 assigned a unique number and included are a short description of the country and the products 
targeted, the source of the complaint, the type of trade barrier involved and the outcome of the 
negotiations.  Super 301  cases and Special 301  cases are included in the sample and are not 
distinguished  from  the rest of the cases,  because once filed  they are processed in the same 
manner as any other Section 301  case.  From 1975 to 1992, ninety-two cases had been filed 
under Section 301 and its amendments.  The last two cases were not determined by the end of 
1993 and therefore are not included in the sample.  Seven other cases either have been dismissed 
by the USTR or withdrawn by the petitioner.  Therefore, a total of nine cases are excluded from 
the sample. 
Of the 83 approved 301 cases, 6 are filed under Super 301, 4 are filed under Special 301, 
and  13  other cases are self-initiated by the President or the USTR.  Forty-two cases are in 
agriculture (both raw and processed agricultural goods), 26 in non-agricultural manufacturing 
and 7 in services.  The most targeted areas are the EU, followed by Japan, South Korea, Canada 
and Brazil.  All but one of the cases involving the EU target their agricultural sector policies. 
The break-down of these cases into targeted countries and industries is presented in Appendix 
Table 2.  Thirty-one percent of the cases result in both countries backing down, while only 20 
percent lead  to  retaliation  at least  for  a  short period  of time.  The United  States  is  most 
successful in Section 301  cases involving Korea and Taiwan,  while the EU and Canada  are 
relatively harder to bargain with.  Surprisingly, Japan seems to respond more favorably to U.S. 
demands than some political opinions have led us to believe. 
Classification of the actual cases into the four possible outcomes (each country can either 
stand fmn or back down) is shown in Appendix Table 2 at the aggregated level.  In some cases, 
16 the final outcome of the negotiations is not clear and  therefore there is some subjectivity in 
determining the decisions taken by both countries (see Kherallah for more details).3 
To measure the effects of the different proxies and show how robust the results are, we 
carry a simplified extreme bound analysis (Leamer).  In Table 1 we present the results of one 
·preferred· specification and discuss predictive performance and robustness of results.
4  Table 
1 shows the marginal effects (not the coefficients) of each exogenous variable.  This marginal 
effect  is  the  change  in  the probability  of standing  fmn  due  to  a  marginal  change  in  the 
exogenous variable.  The results from estimating the first probit equation in system (4) for the 
United States are presented in the first column of Table 1.  The equation predicts 87%  of the 
cases  correctly.  The model also predicts that the United States stands fmn approximately 46% 
of the time,  which is very close to the actual value of 47%.  The log-likelihood  ratio tests 
indicate a good fit and show that the set of explanatory variables is helpful in predicting the 
outcome of Section 301  cases. 
The presidential election dummy (ELECT1) is not significant.  Elections do not seem to 
toughen the stand of the U.S. administration against its trade partners beyond rhetoric.  When 
ELECTI is dropped from the model, there are no changes in the predictive ability of the probit 
equation or in the sign and significance of the remaining coefficients.  Among  the political 
variables, PACEXP (the value of  PAC contributions by the concerned industries) is negative and 
'Tho few IltUdiea that examine Section 301  on a cue-by-case basis diverge in their classification. of the tiDal 
outc.QIDM  Low fiDds that of 77 cases from 1975 to 1990, Only a third led to market ope.Ding, wbile 10 petCCDt of 
the easel remlt iA trade maliation.  FiAger aud Fung, on til. other hand, detetmino that 22 percent of  &2 cuea 
examined c:reato more trade ratrictiQDI aud 62 percent &to trade liberalizing. 
4  W. &ealt  the  hypotbesi.  that  the  two  equations  iA  system  (4)  are iAdependent.  W. cannot  reject  their 
independence.  We  also  le$t  the  hypothesis  that  the  error  terms  are  homoskedastic.  We  fail  to  reject  the 
homoskedasticity assumption. 
17 significant in most specifications,  which is somewhat against conventional wisdom.  Greater 
lobbying efforts appear to pressure the USTR to be more flexible and to try harder to reach an 
agreement rather than stand firm and risk a trade war.  A recent analysis by Oxford Analytica 
(OADB 1994a) on the U.S.-Japanese trade relations corroborates this result and interpretation. 
An alternative explanation is that the USTR actually is pressured through PAC contributions to 
take on cases that have low likelihoods of success resulting in a negative correlation between a 
tough U.S. attitude and political lobbying.'  A note of caution:  this  result is sensitive to the 
exclusion of tariff dummies representing S and T.  The relative employment size of the industry, 
EMPUS, is used alternatively to measure the political costs of backing down.  The variable is 
not  significant,  which  fails  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  smaller-sized  industries  are more 
successful in generating political pressure. 
Unlike in Bayard and Elliott's study, the self-initiation (SELF) dummy has a positive and 
significant impact on the U.S. likelihood of standing firm.  This indicates that making more 
credible public threats with a specific timetable for action enhances the commitment process of 
the United States and increases its costs of backing down.  The estimations show that this effect 
is robust and add 0.27 points to the probability of standing frrm  compared to private industry 
initiation.  6 
The economic variable that approximates the welfare loss from a potential trade war is 
the  U.S.  export  share  in  the  foreign  market  (EXPSU).  The export share  variable  has  a 
'we thank Dan Sumner for suuestina this last explanation. 
~  results suggest that lePlativo iDstruments such as Super 301 and Special 301 inctease the reputation of 
the United States as a tough trade partDer and therefore tho United States is less likely to back down in these cases. 
18 significant negative impact on the probability of standing firm.  This result is robust across the 
various specifications and indicates that the greater the export dependence of the United States 
on the targeted country-s market, the less likely it will take a strong bargaining position because 
there is too much at stake in case of a trade war.  A marginal increase in the export share leads 
to a decrease of 0.14 points in the probability of standing frrm. 
Both  dummies  for low  tariff rates  in the United States and  the foreign  country  are 
marginally significant but have opposite effects on the U.S. trade position.  IfU.5. trade barriers 
on a specific product are low, then the probability of the United States standing firm is lower 
by a margin of 0.0052 compared to if there are medium-level tariffs.  The U.S. is not as keen 
to stand tough and support industries with low trade barriers as opposed to industries that are 
more highly  protected.  The United States  follows  a  pattern of shielding  already-protected 
industries from any further market opening.  On the other hand, if the foreign trade barrier is 
low, the United States is more likely to stand frrm by 0.14 points because it feels it can extract 
more concessions from those foreign industries that are lightly protected. Higher levels of trade 
barriers, however, do not seem to exacerbate either of these effects. Only moving from a low 
to a medium threshold of trade restrictions causes this difference in the likelihood of standing 
frrm. 
The  OECDGDP  variable,  one  of  the  three  proxies  for  the  world/international 
environment,  is  not significant.  Changes in revealed comparative advantages in the  United 
States (COMPl), the second proxy, are not associated with any sizable changes in the likelihood 
of  standing firm: industries petitioning for 301 tend have large degrees of  comparative advantage 
and are mainly attempting to open more protected foreign markets to their products.  The third 
19 variable in this series is the U.S. export share in the world market (USHRl).  The sign and the 
robustness of this variable across the specifications demonstrate that in cases where the United 
States has a relatively smaller share of the world export market, its likelihood of standing fum 
is higher by 0.097 points. 
On the other hand,  whether a  case is negotiated under the GAIT does not create a 
significant difference in the likelihood of standing firm.  This result is consistent with that of 
Bayard and Elliott who fmd  that this variable has no influence on successful openings.  The 
domestic industries' power to influence Section 301 outcomes shows some mixed results.  The 
four-fum concentration ratio (CR4) is insignificant both alone or together with USUNS in the 
regression.  This finding is either an indication of the failure of this measure to capture how well 
an industry is organized or a sign that in highly concentrated industries, the largest fums filing 
for Section 301 do so even at low likelihoods of success because they capture a large share of 
the benefits in case of a successful outcome.  The coefficient of the union membership intensity 
variable (USUNS) is not robust.  When significant, however, it has the predicted sign, indicating 
that union intensity increases the likelihood that the United States will stand fum. 
In contrast to the results of Bayard and Elliott, the distinction between the different types 
of trade  barriers  is  not  significant.  7  On  the  other  hand,  our  findings  suggest  that  both 
agricultural and manufacturing cases increase the likelihood of the United States standing fum 
compared to services and other industries, and IPR cases. The difference in the likelihood of 
standing firm is 0.77  for agriCUlture and 0.90 for manufacturing. 
Finally,  whether  the  U.S.  President  is  Democratic  or  Republican  influences  the 
1 Their typo of trade batriet dummies ;.,. Iliahtly different than ours.  They lump quotas and tariff. toaether, 
whereas we aeparate them into two different cateBories. 
20 bargaining trade stance of the United States.  The negative and  significant effect of the PS 
dummy  on  the likelihood  of standing  firm  suggests  that  Republicans  are more likely  than 
Democrats to back down and try to reach a compromise solution.  Although the frequency of 
301  cases has been approximately the same under Democratic and Republican administrations 
(roughly five cases per year), Democrats exhibit a tougher stance in managed trade.  The recent 
firm demand on the Japanese car industry by the Clinton administration is a good out-of-sample 
check on our model. 
The second column in Table 1 presents the results of the probit estimation of (4) for the 
foreign countries.  The model predicts TI% of the outcomes correctly. Foreign countries are 
predicted to stand firm around 41 % of the time, which is very close to the real number of times 
they do stand fmn (42 %).  The likelihood ratio test is significant across specifications, indicating 
that the combination of exogenous variables has good explanatory power. 
In contrast to the results of the U.S. probit model, election years in the foreign countries 
(ELECT2) have a positive and significant impact on foreign countries' probability of standing 
firm.  For pluralistic countries an election year clearly increases the political cost of backing 
down in terms of loss of  votes or Congressional support. For one party states such as China, this 
argument is less compelling. 
The other variable approximating  the political costs of backing down in the foreign 
countries  is  the  relative  employment  size  of the  industry,  EMPFC.  EMPFC  shows  a 
significantly negative and robust marginal impact on the probability of standing fmn.  When 
smaller well-organized industries are involved, the political costs of backing down are larger. 
Industries with large labor forces may find it harder to organize because of the well-known free-
21 rider problem (Olson).  In addition, larger industries have more to lose from a trade war and 
therefore pressure their trade representatives to be more flexible and accept an agreement to 
prevent a break-down in negotiations and consequent retaliation.  The magnitude of the marginal 
effect is equal to 0.42. 
Two alternative variables are used  to measure the degree of anti-U.S.  feeling  in the 
foreign  countries.  The  proportion  of the  population  that  belongs  to  a  communist  party 
(COMMIES)  and the proportion of votes  that leftist parties have won in the latest election 
(VOTELEFlj  were  both  insignificant  when  used  interchangeably  in  the  specifications 
(VOTELEFf not shown). 
The economic stakes variable, EXPSF, which is the share of  foreign exports towards the 
U.S. is not significant.  This result is surprising.  The data suggest that countries such as South 
Korea and Taiwan that are heavily dependent on the United States for their exports generally 
have accepted U.S. demands for market opening.'  This result may reflect the fact that other 
countries such as Canada and Brazil, which also have a large volume of trade with the United 
States, have not been as cooperative. 
The tariff-level dummies USSL, USSR, and FCTL are non-significant.  Only a high tariff 
rate in the foreign country is associated with a higher likelihood of  standing firm by 0.19 points. 
Again, this is interpreted as a sign that heavily protected industries pressure their governments 
not to change their protectionist policies and to maintain the existing structure of trade barriers 
against competing imports.  None of the world environment variables, OECDGDP, COMP2 or 
GATT are significant, at least not in a robust manner. 
• Y  ooo-Je indicates that the most important bargaining leverage the United States used to open Korea'. insunmce 
market was the country'. largo volume of exports to the United States. 
22 The intensity of labor organization in the foreign country,  FCORG,  is significant and 
positive.  Labor unions, especially those in Europe and Japan, are politically powerful and are 
well known to have much influence on their governments' foreign trade policy.  This suggests 
that the greater the intensity of union membership in anyone country, the more likely that the 
country will stand firm to u.s. demands. 
Contrary to the results of the U.S. probit model, the dummies differentiating the type of 
economic sectors involved are not important,  while the trade barrier dummies are significant. 
The effects of the administrative and price restrictions are positive,  suggesting that relative to 
qualitative measures, both types of trade measures are more likely to lead to a higher probability 
of standing fmn.  In our classification, quantitative restrictions actually are more transparent 
than  the price control  or administrative  measures  because  they  mainly  represent clearly  set 
quotas,  whereas price controls include such things  as  subsidies,  export targeting,  and various 
types of import restrictions.  Less transparent trade barriers are harder to dismantle and the U.S. 
meets  more resistance from  foreign countries when  it comes to changing these types of trade 
practices.  Quotas can be slightly increased, but more complex and indirect trade restrictions are 
harder to change. 
The political rights variable is  marginally  significant.  Its  negative sign  suggests  that 
countries with low levels of political democracy are not as likely to stand firm.  This reflects 
the fact  that countries such as  Canada and  the EU,  which are pluralistic,  have to  respond  to 
special interest groups and therefore are less likely to back down to u.s. pressure.  Countries 
with  a less  competitive  electoral  process  such  as  Korea  and  Taiwan,  however,  have  more 
political latitude in conducting foreign trade policy. 
23 The predicted likelihood of a  trade war,  (1-Fl)(1-F2),  is  the product of the individual 
predicted (l-Fi)'s. It is 19%. The estimated marginal effects on this likelihood are tabulated in 
Table 2.  When the coefficient of an independent variable is statistically not significant,  the 
effect of  the variable is assumed to be zero.  The significant political costs variables indicate that 
when there is an election year in the targeted foreign country or when a case is self-initiated by 
the U.S. administration, the likelihood of  disagreement and retaliation is higher by 0.13 and 0.11 
points respectively.  Both these variables increase the -reputational- cost of backing down and 
therefore lead to tougher negotiations. 
Both PAC expenditures in the United States and a relatively larger share of employment 
in the targeted foreign industry have negative impacts on the probability of a trade war.  The 
lobbying expenditure effect may not be well captured here because when collecting the PAC 
contributions data,  only directly involved industries were considered.  Contributions of those 
industries  that  may  oppose  the case-including  foreign  industries-have not been  included 
because they cannot be clearly identified.  As mentioned earlier, large American firms may also 
lobby for a more friendly approach to trade bargaining because they fear  they will incur large 
losses in case of a trade war.  The negative impact of employment size in the foreign country 
is interpreted as a sign that smaller industries are more effective in pressuring their policy  makers 
to keep them protected from foreign competition. 
Another important result is the lower probability of  trade war when the United States has 
a large export share in the targeted foreign market.  Greater economic dependency increases the 
economic costs of disagreement and therefore induces the United States to reach an agreement 
or at least not to retaliate.  The tariff dummy variables again indicate that when an industry is 
24 already well-protected, there is a tendency for it to remain so and resist liberalization. The world 
environment variables are all  non-significant except for  the U.S.  share in the world  export 
market which if declining increases the likelihood of retaliation.  The United States is keen on 
maintaining its position as the dominant world exporter and therefore is more likely to threaten 
a trade war when export markets are closed to its products. 
Domestic industry structure and level of organization in the United States do not seem 
to  generate any  robust effects on  the likelihood of trade outcomes.  The intensity of labor 
organization in foreign countries, on the other hand, increases the probability that the targeted 
country will not respond to U.S. demands and hence the likelihood of a trade war. 
The most robust results are those related to the agricultural and manufacturing dummies, 
which have a positive impact on the likelihood of a  trade war.  Compared to cases in other 
sectors of the economy, agriculture and manufacturing cases seem to generate the most heated 
debates over trade liberalization.  In the United States, the agriculture and manufacturing shares 
in GDP have been declining steadily over the years as America moves to a more service-oriented 
economy.  This trend  is accompanied by heightened pressure from these two sectors to stand 
frrm and demand -fair-trade- rules to expand their export markets. 
Both price control and administrative barriers are also more likely to generate conflicts 
over  trade  negotiations  because  they  are  less  transparent  than  quotas.  In  addition, 
administrative,  technical and legal barriers are logistically harder to dismantle.  Finally,  the 
results also suggest that a Democratic U.S. presidency is more likely to use tough trade tactics, 
while foreign countries with a pluralistic political system are more likely to lead hard bargaining. 
25 CONCLUSIONS 
Our results have demonstrated the importance of  several economic and political variables 
4> the likelihood of the United States and its trade partners of standing firm and the consequent 
possibility of a trade war situation under Section 301.  The U.S. policymaker is more likely to 
stand frrm when the case is initiated by the President or the USTR, when the foreign country's 
targeted trade barrier is low, when the U.S. export share in world markets is declining, when 
the  industry  involved  is  agriculture  or manufacturing,  and  when  the  U.S.  President  is  a 
Democrat.  On the other hand, the United States is less likely to stand frrm when its export sales 
are more dependent on the foreign  country's market,  when  lobbying expenditures from  the 
domestic concerned industries are higher, and when the petitioning domestic industry has low 
trade barriers. 
Foreign countries stand firm  more often when there is a presidential or parliamentary 
election  going  on,  when  the  domestic  targeted  industry  absorbs  a  small  share  of total 
employment,  when  the intensity of labor organization in the country is high,  and when the 
targeted industry is already well protected from international competition.  Furthermore, when 
the targeted trade barrier is non-transparent, such as legislative and administrative barriers, the 
foreign country is less likely to change its trade practices. 
Our findings suggest an ideal set of conditions that would maximize the likelihood of a 
trade war due to Section 301.  The conditions are that:  1) the U.S. administration self-initiates 
a case against a foreign country that is in the middle of  an election year; 2) the targeted industry 
is  in agricuUure or manufacturing; 3) the trade barrier is not very transparent; 4) the foreign 
industry has a small share of total· employment that generally is unionized;  5) that this same 
26 industry is already well protected from  foreign  competition;  6)  the United states is not very 
dependent on the foreign country's market for its exports; 7) the U.s. share in the world export 
market is declining;  8)  the u.s.  President is a Democrat; and 9) the foreign  country has  a 
pluralistic electoral system. 
U.s. trade law Section 301 is one of the array of tools used by policy-makers to protect 
America from -unfair- foreign trade practices and to expand export markets abroad.  However, 
its use may lead to a variety of inefficient outcomes, which include longer delays in reaching 
agreements,  political confrontations,  trade wars,  and  loss of credibility for the wrO.  The 
fmdings of our study indicate that Section 301 leads to trade retaliation in 19% of the cases, but 
opens markets 56  % of the time.  Based on these figures,  one might believe that the legislation 
is more successful than not in opening closed markets for U.S. exports.  However, a closer look 
at the data suggests  that the change in  foreign  countries'  targeted  trade barriers have been 
partial,  small  in  magnitude  and  have  involved  many  drawn-out  and  costly  negotiations. 
Furthermore, we do not know whether market opening would have occurred without 301 either 
through amicable bilateral negotiations or through the GATT.  Therefore, using Section 301 is 
risky and the returns from it are not always clear and tangible. 
Activist trade policy such as 301, may increase the bargaining power of the United States 
but the costs and risks involved in terms of trade and political conflicts may not be worth it 
(Krugman, Grossman, Dixit).  In addition, 301 only increases the U.S. negotiating leverage if 
the targeted countries remain passive. If  similar types of  legislation are introduced in the foreign 
countries, the United States' superior bargaining position is nullified and may render the United 
States worse off than in the initial situation. Section 301  is especially dangerous if it leads to 
27 specific import targets.  Market share quotas are not an  indication of open trade.  On the 
contrary, they suggest that the flow of goods and services will be determined by government 
bureaucrats and lawyers rather than by the market and free choice.  Government interventions 
of  this type create inefficiencies by diverting trade and encouraging rent-seeking behavior. They 
also lock-in the United States to a  given import share without taking into consideration the 
rapidly changing trade and production patterns that may render these shares either redundant or 
more blll'densome than initially intended. 
More than  50%  of Section 301  cases since  1990 involve Thailand,  India,  China and 
Taiwan.  The trend  towards  targeting  the  practices of developing  countries  is  increasing, 
especially in the service sector and IPR infringements.  The new focus on these countries will 
become  more  important if under  pressure  from  lobbying  groups,  the  United  States  starts 
including labor and environmental standards as target practices.  Developing countries in Asia 
view  the unilateral  approach  taken  by the United  States  as an  -attempt to  undermine their 
competitive advantage- (OADB  1994b).  As  the United States feels  threatened by the rising 
export competition  from  developing countries,  it will increasingly target  these countries for 
-fair- trade practices. 
The wro provides  governments  with  a  useful  forum  in  which  they  can  delegate 
international trade decisions to impartial dispute settlement procedures and therefore diminish 
domestic  pressures  for protection and export promotion.  The wro now includes areas of 
dispute not included before such as services, agriculture, textiles, intellectual property rights and 
government procurement.  This broader mandate and tighter enforcement mechanism may induce 
the United States to settle its trade disputes through the wro  instead of  relying on unilateralism. 
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Figure 1:  Welfare Possibilities in Utility Space Table 1:  Results from the Probit Estimation of (4) for the US and Foreign Countries 
Tho Depeudem Variable is Binary:  The Dependent Variable is Binary: 
(l-PI)-1 if  tba US StaDda Pirm IDd (I-PI)-O if  (1-p2)-1 if the Poreign Country Stands Pirm 
the US Backs Down  and (1-p2)-0 if the Foreign Country Bacb Down 
Independent Variables  Matainal  Independent Variables  MarJinal 
Impact" t- Impact " 
&tat.  t-stat. 
Political  CONST.  .0.0006  Political  CONST.  -0.0033 
Costs  Costs 
Variables  (0.03)  Variables  (O.OS) 
ELECT  1  0.0307  ELECT2  0.2793 
(0.99)  (3.12) 
PACEXP  -0.0275  EMPFC  -0.4169 
(1.97)  (2.SS) 
SELF  0.2706  COMMIES  1.4691 
(2.02)  (1.34) 
Economic  EXPSU  .0.1410  Economic  EXPSF  0.0226 
Costs  Costs 
Variables  (2.24)  Variables  (0.40) 
USSL  -0.0052  USSL  -0.0157 
(1.79)  (0.74) 
USSH  0.0045  USSH  -0.0010 
(0.19)  (0.33) 
FCTL  0.1469  FCTL  -0.0130 
(1.69)  (0.46) 
FCTH  0.0632  FCTH  0.1867 
(1.42)  (2.53) 
World  OECDGDP  0.0021  World  OECDGDP  .0.0077 
Environment  Environment 
Variables  (0.57)  Variables  (1.20) 
COMPI  0.0013  COMP2  0.0020 
(l.41)  (1. IS) GATI'  ~.0029  World  GATI'  ~.012S 
World  Environment 
Environment  (0.44)  Variables  (0.71) 
Variables  USHR1  ~.0972 
(1.95) 
Industry  CR4  ~.01l7  Industry Power  FCORG  0.1312 
Power  Variables 
Variables  (0.54)  (1.76) 
USUNS  0.0476 
(1.18) 
Other  AGIND  0.7731  Other Variables  AGIND  0.0215 
Variables 
(2.62)  (0.46) 
MANIND  0.8980  MANIND  0.0345 
(3.03)  (0.62) 
PCONT  0.0246  PCONT  0.1543 
(0.96)  (2.03) 
ADMIN  0.0132  ADMIN  0.1249 
(0.61)  (1.65) 
PS  ~.OO52  PR  ~.OOS2 
(1.89)  (1.60) 
~ofOutcomes  87~  77% 
Predicted Correctly 
Predicted Probability of Standing  46%  41% 
Firm aI 
Xl - -2*Log(LR)  65.54  42.16 
P-value for the Xl Test  4.98E~7  6.4E-04 
Notes:  Values 10  lthe£es are t-statiSticS.  paten 
aJ The actual probability of IltandiDa firm is equal to 47  ~  for the US and 42  ~  for the foreign 
countries. Table 2:  Marginal Impacts of the Independent Variables on the Probability of 
Disagreement, (1_pl)(1_P2) 
Independent Variables  Marginal Impacts  Level of  SignifiC8DCO 
Political  ELECTl  0  Not Significant 
Costs 
Variables  ELECT2  0.1285  Significant @ the 0.2  ~  level 
PACEXP  -0.0113  Significant @  the S ~  level 
EMPFC  -0.1918  Significant @  the 0.4  ~  level 
SELF  0.1109  Significant @  the 4 ~  level 
COMMIES  0  Not significant 
Economic  EXPSU  -0.0578  Significant @  tho 1.S  ~  level 
Costs 
Variables  EXPSF  0  Not significant 
USSL  -0.0093  Significant @  the 7 ~  level 
USSH  0  Not significant 
FerL  0.0602  Significant at the 9 ~  l.vel 
FCTH  0.0859  Significant @  the  1  ~  level 
World  OECDGDP  0  Not significant 
Environment 
Variables  COMPI  0  Not significant 
COMP2  0  Not significant 
USHRI  -0.0398  Significant @ the S ~  level 
GATT  0  Not significant 
Industry  CR4  0  Not significant 
Power 
Variables  USUNS  0  Not significant 
FCORG  0.0603  Significant @ th. 8 ~  level 
Other  AGIND  0.3170  Significant @  tho o.9~ level 
Variables 
MANIND  0.3682  Significant @  tho 0.1  ~  level 
PCONT  0.0710  Significant @ the  ,,~ level 
ADMIN  .0.OS74  Significant @  the  10~ level 
PS  -0.0021  Significant @  the 6 ~  level 
PR  -0.0024  Significant @  the  11 ~  level 
Notes: The predicted prObability ot a ... -.  ........ wn m negotlatlons. (1-14')(1-1"')  - (U.4tI)(U.42)==U.H/. 
The marginal effects that are not statistically significant (a>0.12) are assumed to equal zero. u.s TRADE THREATS. RHETORIC OR WAR? 
APPENDIX 
This appendix contains the extensive form of the disagreement game; Appendix Table 1 
presents the variables definition their sources and data references, and Appendix Table 2 
summarizes the data on 30  I cases. 2 
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Appendix Figure 1.  Game in Extensive Form 
Stase 1 
Stage 2 Appendix Table 1:  Definition of Variables and Sources in Alphabetical Order 
Variables  Definitions  Sources 
ADMIN  1 if the foreign barrier is administrative or  Office of the USTR Table of 
legislative, 0 otherwise  Section 301 Cases 
AGIND  1 if the targeted product is in the  Office of the USTR Table of 
agricultural industry, 0 otherwise  Section 301 Cases 
COMMIES  Proportion of the population that  '/he World Factbook 
belongs to a communist party 
COMPI  US Relative Product Trade Advantage  US Dept. Of Commerce, Bureau 
- US relativo product Gport advantage - of the Cemus 
US relative product import advantage  FAO Trade Yearbook 
(See Formula in Scott and Vollrath).  International Trade Statistics 
Positive values indicate a competitive  Yearbook 
trade advantage, negative values  UN Commodity Trade Statistics 
indicate competitive trade disadvantage 
COMP2  Same as COMPI but for the FC 
CR4  US Industry four-firm concentration  US Dept. of Commerce various 
ratio at the 4-digit SIC code level  census 
ELEen  1 if it is a Presidential election year  '/he World Factbook 
in the US, 0 otherwise 
ELECT2  1 if there were any type of elections held  '/he World Factbook 
within that year in the FC, 0 otherwise 
EMPFC  Proportion of Industry employment  Yearbook of  Labour Statistics 
relative to total employment in the FC 
EMPUS  Proportion of industry employment  Yearbook of  Labour Statistics 
relative to total employment in the US 
ESCAP  1 if the economic system is  Freedom in the World: PoUtical 
capitalist, 0 otherwise  Righu and Civil Uberties 
ESSOC  1 if the economic syitem is  Freedom in the World: PoUtical 
socialist, 0 otherwise  Rights and Civil Ubertie.r 
ESSTA  1 if  the economic system is capitalist- Freedom in the World: Political 
statist, 0 otherwise  Rights and Civil Uberties 
ESTATIST  1 if tho economic system is  Freedom in the World: P()litical 
statist, 0 otherwise  Righu and Civil Ubertie.r 
EXPSF  Ratio of total value of FC exports to  Direction 0/ Trade Statisllcs 
the US over value of total FC exports 
to tho Rea of ~  World (ROW) Amxmdix Table 1  (continued) 
Variables  Definitions  Sources 
EXPSU  Ratio of tot. value of US exports to the FC  Direction of  Trillk Statistics 
over value of tot. US exports to ROW 
FCORG  Total proportion of  organized labor  The World Factbook 
in the FC 
FCPOS  1 if the FC staoda finD aud  Office of the USTR Table of 
o  if the FC backs down  Section 301 Cases 
FCTH  1 if the resulting foreign trade barrier  Office of  the USTR Table of 
is high, 0 otherwiae  Section 301 Cases 
National Trillk Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trillk Barriers 
International Busina.r Pradlces 
The Year in Trillk: Operation of 
the Trillk Agreements Program 
Trillk PoUcy Agenda and ARnual 
Report of the President of  the us 
on the Trillk Agreementr Program 
GA1T Trillk PoUcy Review 
FCTL  1 if  the resu1tina foreign trade barrier  Same as FCTH 
is low, 0 otherwise 
GATT  1 if the case is oegotiated under the  Office of the USTR Table of 
GATT,Ootherwise  Section 301 Cases 
MANIND  1 if the product targeted is in the  Office of the USTR Table of 
manufacturing industry, 0 otherwise  Section 301 Cases 
OBCDGDP  Annual averago GDP growth rate  OBCD National Accounts: Main 
of OBCD countries  Aggregates 
OTIllND  1 if  the product targeted is in an  Offico of the USTR Table of 
industry othoI' than agricu1turo or  Section 301 Cases 
manufacturing, 0 otherwise 
PACEXP  Proportion of PAC ~  by US  FBC RepoTU on FU'IlUU:ial 
intereata directly affected by the case  Activities 
PCONT  1 if the foreign barrier is • price  Offico gf the USTR Table of 
control, 0 otherwise  Section 301 Cases 
PR  IDdex gf  political righta ranging from  Freedom ia the World: Pt:Nitkal 
1 (fully competitivo electoral procas)  Righu and Civil LibertiD 
to 7 (political despotiam) 
PS  1 if  the US Pniidea.t is Republican, 
o  otherwise Awendix Table I: (continued) 
Variables  DefinitiODB  Sources 
PSCMP  1 for ceotra1iad multiparty political  Freedom in the World: Political 
system, 0 othelwise  Righu and Civil Uberties 
PSCOMM  1 for communist political system,  Freedom  in the World: Political 
o  otherwise  Rights and Civil Uberties 
PSMNP  1 for decentralized multiparty political  Freedom  in the World: PoliJical 
system, 0 otherwise  Rights and Civil Uberties 
PSDPOP  1 for domjnant or one-party political  Freedom  in the World: PoliJical 
system, 0 otherwise  Rights and Civil Uberties 
PSMNP  1 for militarized DOD-party political  Freedom  in the World: PoUtical 
system, 0 otherwise  Rights and Civil Uberties 
QUOTA  1 if tho foreign barrier is a  Office of the USTR Table of 
quantitative restriction, 0 otherwise  Section 301 Cases 
SELF  1 if case is self-initiated by the USTR  Office of the USTR Table of 
or the President, 0 otherwise  Section 301 Cases 
SUXS  1 if there is at least partial market  Office of the USTR Table of 
openina in the FC, 0 otherwise  Section 301 Cases 
7he Economist 
USHRI  Product exportI of tho US to the ROW  lnlernalional Trade Statistics 
over world product exports in value terms  Yearbook 
USPOS  1 if the US stands firm and  Office of tho USTR Table of 
o  if  the US backs down  Section 301 Cases 
7he Economist 
USSH  1 if the resulting US trade barrier  Same as FCTH 
is bigh, 0 otherwise 
USSL  1 if the resultina US trade barrier  Same as FCTH 
is low, 0 otherwise 
USUNM  PeteeDtaao of  UDioo. membership in the  Kokkelenbura and Sockell; 
major US industry involved in tho case  Curme, Hirsch &. 
MacPhenIoo; Hitach and 
MacPherson 
USUNS  Percental. of  UDioo. membership in the  Same as USUNMIND 
specific US industry involved in the case 
VOTELEFT  Proportion of  votes that leftist parties  7he World Factbook 
won durinl tho lait election Appendix Table 2:  Frequency of Section 301  Cases by Countries, Sectors Targeted and Outcomes 
SECTORS TARGETED  US and FC POSmONS (a)  FCMARKET 
OPENING 
COUNTRY  No. of  Agric.  Mnfg.  Serv.  IPR  US-sf  US-sf  US-bd  US-bd  No. of Success. 
eue.  (c)  FC-sf  FC-bd  FC  ...  f  FC-bd  Cases 
EU  21  20  1  0  0  2  4  7  B  11 
, 
Japan  12  5  6  0  0  3  5  0  4  9 
S. Korea  8  3  2  2  1  0  3  1  4  7 
Canada  7  5  1  1  0  4  0  1  2  2 
Brazil  5  1  4- 0  0  1  2  1  1  3 
Argentina  5  2  1  1  0  1  1  2  1  2 
Taiwan  4  2  1·  0  1  0  3  0  1  4 
India  4  1  0  2  1  0  0  3  1  1 
Thailand  3  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  2  1 
China  3  0  2- 0  1  0  2  0  1  3 
Other  11  2  7  1  0  6  2  2  1  3 
TOTAL  83  42  26  7  5  17  22  18  26  46 
PERCENT  100.0  50.6  31.3  8.4  6.0  20.5  26.5  21.7  31.3  55.4 
Notes: (a) FC- Foreign Country; bd=backs-down; sf=stands firm. 
(b) 23 cases are self-initiated; 6 of which are Super 301 and 4 are Special 301; 39 cases are negotiated under the GATT. 
(c) Includes raw and processed agricultural products. 
•  Taiwan', custom duty valuation case DO. 56, and cases Do.73 and 88 targeting Brazil's and China', general import restrictions are 
classified under lIWlufacturing since the majority of their imports from the US are manufactured goods. 
, 
I 
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